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| author | ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com> | 2026-05-08 16:59:10 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-05-28 21:24:47 -0700 |
| commit | bef1006da49c91e8e154223d3005829a394f8f78 (patch) | |
| tree | 6610d14de3865dd9f3ba55672dbedb4564a2aa2b /fs | |
| parent | c0438198c28b1d22c272751af5e717c11d9fa8dd (diff) | |
| download | linux-next-history-bef1006da49c91e8e154223d3005829a394f8f78.tar.gz | |
ocfs2: validate inline xattr header before ibody lookups
Patch series "ocfs2: validate inline xattr header consumers".
Corrupt i_xattr_inline_size can move the computed inode-body xattr header
outside the dinode block. Several OCFS2 paths then trust xh_count or
xattr entry geometry from that unchecked header.
The reported KASAN splat hits the ibody lookup path:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x37b/0x3a0
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get()
ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock()
ocfs2_calc_xattr_init()
The same unchecked header derivation also exists in the outside-value
probe, ibody remove, inline refcount attach, and inline reflink paths.
This series factors the existing ibody list validation into a shared
helper and then converts the remaining inline-header consumers one at a
time.
Patch layout:
1. validate ibody get/find and reuse the helper in ibody list
2. validate the outside-value probe
3. validate ibody remove
4. validate inline refcount attach
5. validate inline reflink
This patch (of 5):
[BUG]
mknodat() can read past the end of a dinode block when ACL inheritance
walks a corrupted inode-body xattr header. Another report shows the same
unchecked lookup later faulting in the VFS open path after create
returns a garbage status.
KASAN: use-after-free in
ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x37b/0x3a0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1078
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801c520300 by task syz.0.10/360
Trace:
...
ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x37b/0x3a0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1078
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1178 [inline]
ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x2ee/0x1110 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1309
ocfs2_calc_xattr_init+0x716/0xac0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:628
ocfs2_mknod+0x935/0x2400 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:333
ocfs2_create+0x158/0x390 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:676
vfs_create fs/namei.c:3493 [inline]
vfs_create+0x445/0x6f0 fs/namei.c:3477
do_mknodat+0x2d8/0x5e0 fs/namei.c:4372
__do_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4400 [inline]
__se_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4397 [inline]
__x64_sys_mknodat+0xb6/0xf0 fs/namei.c:4397
...
Another report:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff3e40ec0
RIP: 0010:__d_entry_type include/linux/dcache.h:414 [inline]
RIP: 0010:d_can_lookup include/linux/dcache.h:429 [inline]
RIP: 0010:d_is_dir include/linux/dcache.h:439 [inline]
RIP: 0010:path_openat+0xe2f/0x2ce0 fs/namei.c:4134
Trace:
...
do_filp_open+0x1f6/0x430 fs/namei.c:4161
do_sys_openat2+0x117/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1437
__x64_sys_openat+0x15b/0x220 fs/open.c:1463
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list() already validates the inline xattr size and
entry count, but ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() and ocfs2_xattr_ibody_find()
still derive the inline header directly from di->i_xattr_inline_size and
then trust xh_count. A corrupted inline size or entry count can therefore
move the computed header outside the dinode block before get/find start
walking it. That can either make ocfs2_xattr_find_entry() dereference
xs->header->xh_count outside the block or make ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock()
bubble a garbage status back through ocfs2_calc_xattr_init() into the
create/open path.
[FIX]
Factor the existing ibody header geometry checks into a shared helper.
Use it in ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() and ocfs2_xattr_ibody_find(), and have
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list() reuse the same helper instead of open-coding
the validation. Reject corrupt ibody metadata with -EFSCORRUPTED before
the lookup path can walk bogus xattr geometry or return a garbage status.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260508085914.61647-1-gality369@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260508085914.61647-2-gality369@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Cc: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 82 |
1 files changed, 47 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c index 86cfd4c2adf92..3a5a17cdcf7eb 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c @@ -950,6 +950,41 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_list_entries(struct inode *inode, return result; } +static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_lookup_header(struct inode *inode, + struct ocfs2_dinode *di, + struct ocfs2_xattr_header **header) +{ + u16 xattr_count; + size_t max_entries; + u16 inline_size = le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size); + + if (inline_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize || + inline_size < sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) { + ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb, + "Invalid xattr inline size %u in inode %llu\n", + inline_size, + (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } + + *header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *) + ((void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - inline_size); + + xattr_count = le16_to_cpu((*header)->xh_count); + max_entries = (inline_size - sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) / + sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry); + + if (xattr_count > max_entries) { + ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb, + "xattr entry count %u exceeds maximum %zu in inode %llu\n", + xattr_count, max_entries, + (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } + + return 0; +} + int ocfs2_has_inline_xattr_value_outside(struct inode *inode, struct ocfs2_dinode *di) { @@ -975,39 +1010,13 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list(struct inode *inode, struct ocfs2_xattr_header *header = NULL; struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode); int ret = 0; - u16 xattr_count; - size_t max_entries; - u16 inline_size; if (!(oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL)) return ret; - inline_size = le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size); - - /* Validate inline size is reasonable */ - if (inline_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize || - inline_size < sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) { - ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb, - "Invalid xattr inline size %u in inode %llu\n", - inline_size, - (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno); - return -EFSCORRUPTED; - } - - header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *) - ((void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - inline_size); - - xattr_count = le16_to_cpu(header->xh_count); - max_entries = (inline_size - sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) / - sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry); - - if (xattr_count > max_entries) { - ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb, - "xattr entry count %u exceeds maximum %zu in inode %llu\n", - xattr_count, max_entries, - (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno); - return -EFSCORRUPTED; - } + ret = ocfs2_xattr_ibody_lookup_header(inode, di, &header); + if (ret) + return ret; ret = ocfs2_xattr_list_entries(inode, header, buffer, buffer_size); @@ -1200,8 +1209,9 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get(struct inode *inode, return -ENODATA; xs->end = (void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize; - xs->header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *) - (xs->end - le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size)); + ret = ocfs2_xattr_ibody_lookup_header(inode, di, &xs->header); + if (ret) + return ret; xs->base = (void *)xs->header; xs->here = xs->header->xh_entries; @@ -2726,12 +2736,14 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_find(struct inode *inode, xs->xattr_bh = xs->inode_bh; xs->end = (void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize; - if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL) - xs->header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *) - (xs->end - le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size)); - else + if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL) { + ret = ocfs2_xattr_ibody_lookup_header(inode, di, &xs->header); + if (ret) + return ret; + } else { xs->header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *) (xs->end - OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_xattr_inline_size); + } xs->base = (void *)xs->header; xs->here = xs->header->xh_entries; |
