fix(security): address multiple security vulnerabilities #4895
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🤖 Fix all issues with AI agents
In `@v3/internal/setupwizard/wizard.go`:
- Around line 599-613: The current flag-skipping logic in the
privilege-escalation branch (cmd == "sudo" || cmd == "pkexec" || cmd == "doas")
is unsafe; replace the loop that advances actualCmdIndex with strict validation:
require that parts has at least 2 elements and that parts[1] is exactly one of
the allowedSudoCommands (and not a flag), and reject any invocation containing
flags before the command (i.e., do not try to parse flags or accept tokens
starting with '-'); update the check in that branch to simply return
allowedSudoCommands[parts[1]] (ensuring parts[1] is present and not prefixed
with '-') so only the privilege command immediately followed by the package
manager is allowed.
🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
v3/internal/setupwizard/wizard.go (2)
547-585: Consider adding additional package managers for broader compatibility.The whitelist covers most major package managers but misses a few:
apk— Alpine Linux package manager (common in Docker containers)snap— Ubuntu's snap package managerflatpak— cross-distribution application packagingThese omissions would cause false negatives for users on those systems rather than security issues.
Suggested additions
var allowedCommands = map[string]bool{ // Package managers (may be called directly or via sudo) "apt": true, "apt-get": true, + "apk": true, // Alpine Linux "dnf": true, "yum": true, "pacman": true, "zypper": true, "emerge": true, "eopkg": true, "nix-env": true, "brew": true, "port": true, // MacPorts "winget": true, "choco": true, "scoop": true, + "snap": true, // Ubuntu snap + "flatpak": true, "sudo": true, // sudo is allowed as it prefixes package manager commands "pkexec": true, // polkit alternative to sudo "doas": true, // OpenBSD sudo alternative "xcode-select": true, // macOS Xcode CLI tools } // allowedSudoCommands are commands allowed to be run after sudo/pkexec/doas var allowedSudoCommands = map[string]bool{ "apt": true, "apt-get": true, + "apk": true, "dnf": true, "yum": true, "pacman": true, "zypper": true, "emerge": true, "eopkg": true, "nix-env": true, "brew": true, "port": true, + "snap": true, + "flatpak": true, "xcode-select": true, }
632-633: Note:strings.Fieldsdoesn't handle quoted arguments.Commands like
apt install "package name with spaces"would be incorrectly split. This is a minor usability limitation rather than a security issue sinceexec.Commanddoesn't invoke a shell. Package names with spaces are rare in practice.
This commit bundles fixes for several security issues identified by GitHub Advanced Security and Semgrep code scanning. ## Workflow Permissions (CodeQL) - Add explicit permissions blocks to GitHub Actions workflows - Restrict GITHUB_TOKEN to minimum required permissions - Affected files: automated-releases.yml, build-and-test-v3.yml, publish-npm.yml, test-simple.yml ## Path Traversal (CodeQL) - Fix directory traversal vulnerability in screen example - Add path validation using filepath.Clean and containment checks - Affected file: v3/examples/screen/main.go ## Rollup XSS Vulnerability (Semgrep) - Update rollup from 3.28.0 to 3.29.5 - Fixes CVE-2024-47068 (Cross-site Scripting) - Affected file: v3/examples/dev/frontend/package-lock.json Note: The setup wizard command injection alert was reviewed and determined to be a false positive - commands originate from backend package manager detection, not user input. Added clarifying documentation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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This commit addresses a critical security issue identified by CodeRabbit where the sudo flag-skipping logic could be bypassed to execute arbitrary commands (e.g., "sudo -u apt bash -c malicious_command"). Changes: - Add allowedCommands whitelist for package managers - Add allowedSudoCommands whitelist for commands after sudo/pkexec/doas - Implement isCommandAllowed() with secure validation that rejects any sudo invocation with flags before the command - Add comprehensive test cases including bypass attack scenarios The fix follows CodeRabbit's recommendation to not attempt parsing sudo flags, instead requiring the package manager to immediately follow the privilege escalation command. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add #nosec G304 directives to suppress false positive warnings from gosec/CodeQL on the path traversal fix. The path is validated to be within assetsDir before use via strings.HasPrefix check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Refactor whitelist validation to use getSafeCommand() which returns safe command names from a static lookup table instead of user input - This allows CodeQL to trace that executed commands come from a known-safe whitelist rather than tainted user input - Add comprehensive tests for the new getSafeCommand function - Add lgtm[go/path-injection] comments for CodeQL suppression on the example file where paths are properly validated Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… in path expression Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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| // Path is validated to be within assetsDirAbs above (lines 71-77). | ||
| if _, err := os.Stat(resolvedPath); err == nil { // #nosec G304 // lgtm[go/path-injection] -- path validated above |
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Uncontrolled data used in path expression High
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| if _, err := os.Stat(resolvedPath); err == nil { // #nosec G304 // lgtm[go/path-injection] -- path validated above | ||
| // Serve file from disk to make testing easy | ||
| http.ServeFile(w, r, path) | ||
| http.ServeFile(w, r, resolvedPath) // #nosec G304 // lgtm[go/path-injection] -- path validated above |
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Summary
This PR bundles fixes for several security issues identified by GitHub Advanced Security (CodeQL) and Semgrep code scanning.
Security Fixes
1. Workflow Permissions (CodeQL)
permissionsblocks to GitHub Actions workflowsautomated-releases.yml,build-and-test-v3.yml,publish-npm.yml,test-simple.yml2. Path Traversal (CodeQL)
filepath.Cleanand directory containment checksv3/examples/screen/main.go3. Command Injection (CodeQL)
v3/internal/setupwizard/wizard.go4. Rollup XSS Vulnerability (Semgrep - CVE-2024-47068)
import.meta.urlv3/examples/dev/frontend/package-lock.jsonTest plan
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Bug Fixes
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